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HOSPITAL CORPORATE
LIABILITY-TOWARD A STRICTER
STANDARD FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES
MARCIA A. MOBILIA*

In the not too distant past, a patient who placed himself in
the care of a hospital had no recourse against the institutional or
corporate entity of the hospital for injuries received during
treatment within its walls. The injured patient could look only
to the attending physician to recover for the physician's malpractice or for his failure to supervise his supporting staff. The
rule of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital' was the
law for many decades. In that case, Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote:
Certain principles of law governing the rights and duties of
hospitals, when maintained as charitable institutions have, after much discussion, become no longer doubtful. It is the settled rule that such a hospital is not liable for the negligence of
its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients. This exemption has been placed upon two grounds. The first is that of
implied waiver. It is said that one who accepts the benefit of a
* Associate, Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, Massachusetts. B.S., Tufts
University, 1979; M.S., Tufts University, 1982; J.D., University of Connecticut School of

Law, 1983; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1984.
1. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). Charitable immunity barred suits against hospitals and medical facilities in South Carolina until the decision in Brown v. Anderson
County Hospital Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977). There, a majority of the
court stated that hospitals could not enjoy charitable immunity for "heedlessness and
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Id. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 877. Justice Ness
wrote in dissent that charitable immunity should be abolished altogether. Id. at 488-91,
234 S.E.2d at 877-79.
The legislature responded to the Brown decision by abrogating the charitable immunity doctrine for all "tortious" acts of hospitals. S.C. CODE AN. § 44-7-50 (1976). In 1981,
Justice Ness' view prevailed and charitable immunity was abolished completely, for all
types of organizations. Fitzer v. Greater Greenville Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 277
S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 230 (1981). In Moultrie v. Medical Univ. of S.C., 280 S.C. 162, 311
S.E.2d 730 (1984), the court affirmed a directed verdict against a teaching hospital for
the negligence of its employees, apparently on the theory of respondeat superior.Thus,
corporate liability for hospitals is a viable concept in South Carolina, at least within the
bounds of respondeat superior.
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charity enters into a relation which exempts one's benefactor
from liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity. The hospital remains exempt, though the patient makes some payment to help defray the cost of board.
Such a payment is regarded as a contribution to the income of
the hospital, to be devoted, like its other funds to the maintenance of the charity. The second ground of the exemption is
the relation subsisting between a hospital and the physicians
who serve it. It is said that this relation is not one of master
and servant, but that the physician occupies the position, so to

speak, of an independent contractor, following a separate calling, liable, of course, for his own wrongs to the patient whom
he undertakes to serve, but involving the hospital in no liability, if due care has been taken in his selection. On one or the
other, and often on both of these grounds, a hospital has been
held immune from liability to patients for the malpractice of
its physicians.2
Thus, the immunity enjoyed by hospital organizations has two
bases: charitable immunity covering the entity itself, and a belief that hospitals lacked the control over the actions of physicians required for vicarious liability to be imposed.
It was not until the 1957 decision in Bing v. Thunig3 that
the courts recognized that the role of modern hospitals has
changed dramatically since the turn of the century, when the
hospital did little more than provide room and board for its unfortunate inmates. The court in Bing stated:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to
treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors
and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to
act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact.
Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly
demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment.
They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and
treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not
that its nurses or other employees will act on their own

2. 211 N.Y. at 128-29, 105 N.E. at 93 (citations omitted).
3. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss4/4

2

Mobilia: Hospital Corporate Liability -- Toward a Stricter Standard for Ad

1985]

HOSPITAL CORPORATE LiABiLITy

responsibility.
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities
borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue their
exemption from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The
test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or
profit-making, as it is for every other employer, was the person
who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its
employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his
4
employment.
While the court in Bing based its decision on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which holds a principal vicariously liable
for the tortious conduct of his agent, a second theory of liability
soon developed to hold a hospital directly liable for its negligence. In the past the law distinguished between the medical
and administrative services performed by hospital employees.
The decision in Bing addressed the problems inherent in this
distinction:
The difficulty of differentiating between the "medical" and the
"administrative" in this context, highlighted as it is by the disagreement of the judges below, is thus brought into sharp
focus.
That difficulty has longed [sic] plagued the courts and, indeed, as consideration of a few illustrative cases reveals, a consistent and clearly defined distinction between the terms has
proved to be highly elusive. Placing an improperly capped hot
water bottle on a patient's body is administrative, while keeping a hot water bottle too long on a patient's body is medical.
Administering blood, by means of a transfusion, to the wrong
patient is administrative, while administering the wrong blood
to the right patient is medical. Employing an improperly sterilized needle for a hypodermic injection is administrative, while
improperly administering a hypodermic injection is medical.
Falling to place sideboards on a bed after a nurse decided that
they were necessary is administrative, while failing to decide
that sideboards should be used when the need does exist is
medical. 5
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v.

4. Id. at 666-67, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
5. Id. at 660-61, 143 N.E.2d at 4-5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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Charleston Community Memorial Hospitals crystallized the
sentiment that this distinction is artificial, unsound, and unpredictable. Darling established the principle of hospital corporate
liability for negligence in the performance of its administrative
duties. The standard of care announced in that decision requires
that the hospital use due care not only in granting staff privileges to physicians but also in adequately supervising the treat7
ment the physicians provide within its walls.
Since Darling, courts have gone beyond its holding and
have extended liability in circumstances in which the plaintiff
could not have proven negligence. The decisions are scattered,
and there is no unifying principle under which they fall. Some
courts have decided in favor of plaintiffs under theories of hospital negligence that deviate significantly from traditional tort
principles. Other courts have turned to theories of res ipsa loquitur or strict liability in tort. When the injury was caused by a
dangerous medical product, some courts have been willing to
consider patients' claims based upon strict products liability. To
the extent that these cases adopt the policies underlying strict
products liability, they reflect an orientation toward strict liability for hospital services.
This Article examines the trend toward strict liability
against the background of traditional immunity of hospitals to
liability in tort. It argues that the policy considerations behind
implied warranty theory and strict products liability may also be
extended to hospital administrative functions. It concludes that
if these policies compel adoption of a strict standard of liability
for "hospital malpractice,"" courts should further those objectives by clearly formulating a legal standard that encompasses

6. 33 Ill.
2d 236, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
7. See Comment, Piercingthe Doctrine of Hospital CorporateLiability, 17 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 383, 386-91 (1980). The general negligence standard is based upon the standard of conduct that would be expected from the ordinary prudent person exercising
reasonable care and skill. The standard is an external or objective one rather than one of
individual judgment. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 32 at 73-74
(5th ed. 1984).
8.The stricter standards that are arising would apply only to hospital "malpractice"
and not to physician negligence. Those hospital services traditionally governed by a negligence standard which might be subject to the stricter standard include the analysis of
blood, the transportation of patients, the performance of other laboratory testing, and
similar services. Nursing services and other professional functions should continue to be
judged by a negligence standard regardless of how other services are governed.
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both the service and product aspects of hospital care.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

CharitableImmunity

As seen in Schloendorff, the traditional reluctance to impose direct liability on the hospital as a corporate entity stems
from the doctrine of charitable immunity.9 This concept arose in
order to protect a charity's funds against diversion from charitable hospital purposes to nonmedical purposes. The medical and
legal communities were concerned that without immunity from
lawsuits, the very existence of the charity might be jeopardized.
Although these concerns may have been legitimate in the past,
the doctrine of charitable immunity has lost most of its vitality
because, today, health care constitutes one of the largest industries in the nation. Thus, the financial necessity for immunity is
no longer compelling. 10
B. Respondeat Superior
Prior to Darling, an injured patient whose claim was not
barred by charitable immunity could maintain a cause of action
against a hospital only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This doctrine holds a principal responsible for the torts of
his agents, and generally requires the existence of an employment relationship. For this reason, patients were prevented from
suing hospitals for the torts of staff physicians who were not
hospital employees. 1 '

9. See generally Feoffees of Heriot's Hasp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
10. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970). In response to the hospital's argument that it should be immune from suit, the
court in Cunningham stated: "[W]e do not believe in this present day and age, when the
operation of ... hospitals constitutes one of the biggest businesses in this country, that
hospital immunity can be justified on the protection-of-the-funds theory." 47 Il.2d at
457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
11. Hospitals generally grant medical staff privileges to two types of "staff physicians." The first type receives no direct compensation from the hospital, but has the
privilege of using hospital facilities in return for bringing in private patients from whom

the hospital collects fees for its services. Additionally, these physicians are generally required to devote a nominal amount of time to the hospital in connection with clinical,

administrative, or research functions. The second class is comprised of staff physicians
who are employed full or part time and who devote most of their time to work in the
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Even when the negligent physician is a hospital employee,
some cases hold that respondeat superior is not available to
hold the hospital liable. 12 Traditional agency theories fail when
analyzing the physician-hospital relationship. At the heart of respondeat superioris the notion that the principal should be liable because he chooses to act through agents and controls their
actions. 13 Hospital administrators, however, may not control
physicians in the exercise of their professional medical judgment. Not only are they unqualified to do so, but such control
14
would likely violate state medical practice statutes.
Because the right-of-control test failed under these circumstances, courts created tests for liability which more accurately
reflected the relationships among patient, physician and hospital. As early as 1903, courts held hospitals liable under a modified respondeat superior test. In that year, the California Supreme Court held in Brown v. La Soci&t6 Francaise de
Bienfaisance Mutuelle"5 that a two-pronged test should apply.
The first element apparently asked whether the patient sought
treatment primarily from the hospital. This factor is relevant
because, unlike most tort victims, malpractice plaintiffs choose
their tortfeasors. 6 Because of this factor, the courts should consider whether the patient looked primarily to the hospital or to
the physician for treatment.
The second element of the test espoused in Brown concerned the relationship between the hospital and the physician,
and considered whether the hospital paid the physician a salary.17 This step in the analysis assures, in the interest of fairness
to the hospital, that a close relationship exists between these

hospital. Full time hospital physicians are not compensated on a fee-for-service or percentage basis, although they are usually expected to justify their salaries by providing
medical services that create income for the facility.
12. See Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1977)(holding that a physician
performing medical services in a hospital has the status of master or principal, not servant, and therefore the hospital cannot be held liable through respondeat superior for
his negligence even though the physician is employed by the hospital).
13. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 70 at 500.
14. Comment, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationship: Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385 (1975).
15. 138 Cal. 475, 71 P. 516 (1903).
16. Comment, supra note 14, at 393-94.
17. 138 Cal. at 476, 71 P. at 516.
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two actors.1 8 When the physician is a salaried employee of the
hospital and the patient sought treatment primarily from the
hospital, liability is clearly established. When the physician receives compensation based only on the number of patients
treated, the Brown holding would not extend liability to the hospital. However, some courts have held that a hospital may be
liable for the tortious conduct of staff members who are clearly
not salaried employees under an ostensible agency theory.1 9
C.

The Darling Decision As a New Basis for Liability

Darling recognized that a hospital does not provide just
room and board but is instead a multi-disciplinary unit which is
independently responsible for the delivery of diverse services.20
The facts of this landmark case were compelling. The plaintiff, a
young college football player, sustained multiple leg fractures in
the course of a game. Darling was taken to the Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, a small facility accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and licensed by
the state of Illinois. The plaintiff was treated by an on-call staff
physician who was unskilled in orthopedics. 21 The leg was set

18. Comment, supra note 14, at 396.
19. E.g., Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972)(holding that
while the defendant physician was actually an independent contractor, the defendant
medical center remains liable because of the existence of an ostensible agency).
It has been suggested that the Brown test becomes strained when applied to a patient who seeks treatment primarily from the hospital but is referred to a nonsalaried
staff physician. In such a case the Brown test alone may not support liability against the
hospital, and the plaintiff may need to rely on an ostensible agency theory. Comment,
supra note 14, at 403.
20. See Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical
Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?," 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 27, 33 (1978); Comment,
The Hospital'sResponsibility for its Medical Staff: Prospectsfor Corporate Negligence
in California, 8 PAc. L.J. 141, 144 (1977).
21. 33 Ill. 2d at 334, 211 N.E.2d at 255. A separate cause of action for malpractice
against the attending physician was settled out of court. The physician's negligence was
therefore not at issue in the case against the hospital. There is considerable dispute
whether this physician was actually employed by the hospital. Neither of the appellate
opinions in Darling refers to the existence of any employment relationship. Yet, later
cases give significant weight to the fact that the attending physician was a hospital employee. See Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 18 Ill. App. 3d 847, 299 N.E.2d 326
(1973); Lundahl v. Rockford Medical Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671
(1968). Notwithstanding the fact that the Darling court alternatively could have held the
hospital liable under existing theories of respondeat superior, the case remains significant. Darling explicitly rejected vicarious liability for physician employee malpractice as
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prematurely in a cast, causing edema and infection. For more
than two weeks, Darling complained of pain. Nevertheless, the
attending physician failed to seek a consultation from a specialist. While the nurses noted Darling's complaints, they failed to
notify the attending physician of a foul odor emanating from the
leg, failed to take blood tests which would have disclosed vascular deterioration, and failed to recognize symptoms of infection.
The leg became gangrenous and was amputated after the efforts
of another hospital to save the leg proved futile.
The Illinois courts permitted the plaintiff to maintain a
cause of action directly against the hospital for the negligent selection and supervision of its staff employees. 2 Liability was
based on the hospital's duty to use reasonable care in selecting
and supervising its staff, which was independent of respondeat
superior and flowed directly to the patient.2 3 The imposition of
a duty to supervise was unprecedented and was said to arise out
of the hospital's "administrative" responsibilities in delivering
medical services. Several courts adopting the Darling rationale,
however, have gone beyond the negligence principles announced
there, and have imposed liability under circumstances in which a
negligence theory alone would not have been successful.2 Thus,
it becomes instructive to examine the decisions in order to provide guidance for hospitals in understanding their duties and the
scope of their potential liability.

the sole remedy available to an injured patient. The Darlingrationale rests on the duty
of the hospital staff to supervise the care provided in its facility. 33 m. 2d at 333, 211
N.E.2d at 256.
22. 33 Ill. 2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 256, aff'g 50 IMI.
App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149
(1964).
23. See also Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307
(1971), afJ'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972). In Joiner, a nonemployee staff physician negligently diagnosed a patient who subsequently died of a heart attack. The court
held the hospital liable for failing to exercise due care in determining the doctor's competence. 125 Ga. App. at 3, 186 S.E.2d at 308.
24. See, e.g., Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz. 516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980); Tucson Medical
Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65
A.D.2d 388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d
335 (1972). In Fridena,the court identified an "emerging trend" of holding a hospital
liable for its failure to supervise staff members and to review medical treatment and held
that the appropriate inquiry was whether the hospital had actual or constructive knowledge of the quality of treatment it provided. 127 Ariz. at 519, 622 P.2d at 466.
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Darling

A. Liability for Negligent Selection of Staff Physicians
It seems clear that a hospital has an affirmative duty to all
patients to use reasonable care in the selection of its medical
staff.2 5 This duty clearly was one of the bases for holding the
hospital liable in Darling.26 The decisions imposing this duty are
not derived from some revolutionary doctrine but are grounded
in traditional common law. For example, the New Jersey Superior Court in Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital27 stated at the
outset that a hospital is not liable for the negligence of a doctor
who is not a hospital employee. The court stated, however, that
in agency law, the negligent engagement of an iridependent contractor is itself an actionable tort. This act is independent of the
physician's malpractice and renders the hospital directly, not vicariously, liable. While the result is hardly novel, the case is significant because the plaintiff joined as defendants not only the
hospital as an independent entity but also the entire medical
staff.

28

In Corleto, the plaintiff urged that the hospital should be
held liable because the medical staff, as an agent of the hospital,
knew or should have known that the defendant physician was
not competent to perform the procedure which resulted in injury. Although the court acknowledged that it was unlikely that
25. See Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Purcell v. Zimbelnan, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Gonzales v. Nork, 20 Cal. 3d
500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229
Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IlM.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Holton v. Resurrection
Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1980); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 IMI.
App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236
N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App.
638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hasp., 99 Wis. 2d 708,
301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
26. 50 Ill. App. 2d at 333-34, 200 N.E.2d at 188-89.
27. 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
28. The entire staff was implicated because no one could determine how much each
member actually knew about the physician's professional competence. The Corleto court
noted that there was precedent for designating the medical staff of a hospital as a party
in civil litigation. 138 N.J. Super. at 312, 350 A.2d at 539. See also Greisman v. Newcomb
Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141
A.2d 18 (1958).
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all 141 staff members knew or should have known of the specific
act or of the individual physician's propensity to commit malpractice, it upheld the plaintiff's cause of action. The court cited
Darling and expressly recognized the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence. 29 Liability here was predicated on the fact that,
in fulfilling its administrative function oft selecting and supervising treatment in the facility, the hospital must act through
agents-the hospital staff.30
Although the Corleto case was subsequently settled, the fact
that the court upheld a cause of action against an entire medical
staff for an individual staff member's malpractice indicates that
liability might be established even without any direct evidence
of negligence. The plaintiff clearly was not prepared to prove
fault on the part of each of the defendants. Nevertheless, in upholding the cause of action, the court chose to place the responsibility for medical staff functions directly on the medical staff.
The decision, according to one commentator, "adds teeth to all
the previous hospital corporate liability cases. It puts
the onus
'31
on the medical staff. . . to police its own ranks.
Hospitals may satisfy the standard of care for staff selection
by inquiring into statements on a physician's application for
staff membership. All colleges and hospitals which are listed on
the application should be contacted. As with any employment
application, gaps in time should be questioned. Hospitals should
also seek out the applicant's peers in the profession to discover
his reputation and qualifications. Administrators should be advised to check for board certification and to consult the county
court files for past and pending malpractice actions.3 2 It is im-

portant to note, however, that neither recommendation by other
members of the medical staff nor reliance on the existence of a
valid license to practice medicine is sufficient to meet this duty
of care. 3 Ultimately, the responsibility is on the institution to

29. 138 N.J. Super. at 308, 350 A.2d at 538.
30. Id.
31, Couch, Hospital CorporateLiability for Inadequate Quality Assurance Versus
Physician's Actions for the Denial, Deferral or Limitation of Their Staff Privileges-Resolving the Dilemma in Pennsylvania, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 14, 23 (1980).
32. See generally Note, Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital: Corporate
Liability of Hospitals Arrives in Wisconsin, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 453.
33. See, e.g., Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972).
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monitor the competence of its staff.
B.

Liability for Negligent Supervision

34
Darling also imposed on the hospital a duty to supervise
and review treatment within the facility. 5 This duty included a
requirement that the hospital review physicians' compliance
with established hospital procedures. In Bost v. Riley,3 6 a North
Carolina court held that a hospital must make a "reasonable effort" to monitor and oversee treatment. Since the hospital had
required physicians to keep progress notes on each patient, the
court reasoned that it had a further duty to see that this rule
was followed.3 7 The extent of the duty to supervise remains un-

At the same time that hospitals were expected to tighten their criteria for staff admission, some courts were insisting that physicians applying for medical staff membership be afforded both procedural and substantive due process rights. See generally Loveridge & Kimball, Hospital CorporateNegligence Comes to California, 14 PAC. L.J. 803,
812 (1983). Thus, hospitals are forced to balance the physician's rights against its duty to
its patients to provide a competent medical staff. Id.
34. Hospitals have also been held directly liable for breach of two other types of
duties. The first is the duty to exercise reasonable care in providing proper medical
equipment, medication, supplies, and food. See Note, CorporateNegligence of Hospitals
and the Duty to Monitor and Oversee Medical Treatment, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 309,
317 (1980)(citing Revenis v. Detroit Gen. Hosp., 63 Mich. App. 79, 234 N.W.2d 411
(1975)); Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d
733 (1976). See also Chandler Gen. Hosp. v. Purvis, 123 Ga. App. 334, 181 S.E.2d 77
(1971); Milner v. Huntsville Memorial Hosp., 398 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
The second duty requires the hospital to use reasonable care in providing and maintaining safe premises, to repair known dangers, to warn of risks, and to inspect and discover unknown risks. See Note, supra, at 317 (citing Chandler Gen. Hosp. v. Purvis, 123
Ga. App. 334, 181 S.E.2d 77 (1971); Ackerburg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hosp., 366
Mich. 596, 115 N.W.2d 290 (1962)). See also Norwood Clinic, Inc. v. Spann, 240 Ala. 427,
199 So. 840 (1941).
35. See Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Gonzales v. Nork, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978); Holton v.
Resurrection Hosp., 88 IlM.App. 3d 655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1980); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson
Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638,
262 S.E.2d 391 (1980). Cf. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280
N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967). In Fiorentino,the court held that a hospital is liable only if it is
grossly negligent in failing to intervene. This would be the case, for example, if the hospital failed to intervene when it had actual knowledge that an act of malpractice would
occur. The court was concerned that imposition of any higher duty would interfere with
the physician-patient relationship. Note, Hospital CorporateLiability: An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGE-S L. REv. 342, 363
(1979).
36. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980).
37. Id. at 648, 262 S.E.2d at 396.
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clear to date. At a minimum the cases require that any procedures established by the institution itself must be followed.
C. Raising the Industry's Standard of Care
In Darling,regulations, accreditation standards, and hospital bylaws were admitted into evidence as probative of industry
custom. These items were held relevant to demonstrate both
feasibility and constructive knowledge by the hospital administration of Darling's condition. The jury was properly instructed,
however, that this evidence was not conclusive of the level of
care which must be exercised. 3s This jury instruction was important because at issue in Darling was the existence of feasible,
customary practices. Compare, for example, the California trial
court decision in Gonzales v. Nork,39 which purported to use
Darling principles to impose a standard of care in hospital ad40
ministration higher than that customarily practiced.
In Gonzales, the patient suffered injuries which allegedly resulted from a staff physician's negligence. Gonzales sued the
hospital directly for its failure to supervise and evaluate the
competence of its medical staff.4 1 The trial court held the defendant hospital liable for a physician's negligence despite its finding that the hospital had implemented a better-than-average
peer review system for evaluating the quality of care rendered
by the medical staff.42 The court determined that its techniques
for the evaluation of medical care were primitive, and thus, even
the hospital's better-than-average performance would not absolve it of responsibility.4 3 The court held that the hospital was
liable notwithstanding its seemingly acceptable efforts to super-

38. 33 111. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
39. Memorandum of decision, Civ. No. 228566 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Nov. 26, 1973).
40. As Dean Prosser stated: "[I1f the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible
consequences are serious, the question is not one of mathematical probability alone
.... As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution." W. PROSSER & W.P.
KEETON, supra note 7, § 31 at 171.

41. Memorandum of decision, Civ. No. 228566 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Nov. 26, 1973).
42. Although the hospital had no actual knowledge of the physician's propensity to
commit malpractice, "it was negligent in not knowing. It was negligent in not knowing
because it did not have a system for acquiring knowledge." Memorandum of decision,
Civ. No. 228566 at 194 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Nov. 26, 1973).
43. Id.
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vise the medical care provided within the facility. In light of the
statement of the Illinois Court of Appeals in Darlingthat "[t]he
duty of a hospital may not be fulfilled merely by utilizing the
means at hand in the particular city where the hospital is lo' the result in Gonzales should not be surprising. It must
cated,"44
be remembered, however, that the Darling court was concerned
with violations of existing regulations, standards, and bylaws,
and not with conduct which met all established safety standards
as in Gonzales. The court in Gonzales was forced to reach beyond the bounds of negligence law to impose liability based on a
standard more stringent than that existing in the industry.
The California court in Gonzales thus attempted to set industry standards by judicial decree as did the widely criticized
decision in Helling v. Carey.45 In Helling, the Washington appellate court held a defendant ophthalmologist liable for malpractice in failing to administer a glaucoma test notwithstanding the
low incidence of glaucoma among patients of the plaintiff's age.
The physician argued that the test would not normally have
been performed on such a patient and that his omission was not
negligent according to prevailing medical standards. In rejecting
the physician's argument that he had conformed to the common
practice in the profession, the court in Helling declared that
without regard to industry practice, "[c]ourts must in the end
say what is required.14 Just as Helling met with immediate criticism 47 and as a result of which was superseded by statute, 48 the

Gonzales decision encountered similar resistance and was ultimately reversed on appeal.49

44. 50 Ill. App. 2d at 313, 200 N.E.2d at 179.
45. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
46. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983 (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932))(italics omitted). In a concurring opinion, Associate Justice Utter stated that even

if reasonably prudent ophthalmologists would not have taken such a precaution, the
physician should nevertheless be held liable under a theory of strict liability in tort for

resulting injuries. 83 Wash. 2d at 520, 519 P.2d at 984.
47. The Helling decision spawned numerous spirited law review commentaries. See
generally Wechsler & Classe, HeUing v. Carey- Caveat Medicus, 48 J. AM. OPToMEmSTS

AsS'N 1526 (1977); Charfoos, Helling: The Law of Medical Malpractice Rewritten, 2
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 692 (1975).

48. The Washington legislature enacted a statute in the session immediately following the Helling decision which re-instituted the negligence standard. See WAsH.
CODE

REV.

§ 4.24.290 (1975).

49. 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d

458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978). The hospital did not appeal from the trial court's
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While purporting to adopt the Darling rationale, the courts
in Corleto and Gonzales have deviated from standards of care
justified under a negligence theory. Rather, they have reached
results that avoid inquiries into fault in imposing liability. When
courts raise the standard of care required in hospital administration beyond mere negligence, the underpinnings of strict liability
begin to take form. 5°
D.

The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

In the modern operating room, many specialized clinicians,
using highly technical instruments, provide treatment. Consequently a patient encounters problems in proving responsibility
for injuries occurring during the course of treatment. The problem becomes particularly compelling if the injury occurs while
the patient is unconscious. To assist such an injured patient,
courts sometimes invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.51 This
judicially created doctrine supplies an inference of negligence 52
in cases in which a plaintiff is injured by an instrumentality that
was within the exclusive control of the defendant. To obtain the
benefit of this inference, the plaintiff must prove that such an
event generally does not occur in the absence of negligence and
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.5 3 Once invoked, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shifts to the defendant

decision.
50. See Weyna, Dubin v. Michael Reese Memorial Hospital and Medical Center:
Seeing Through the Product/ServiceDistinction, 48 1NS. COUNS. J. 399, 404-08 (1981).
51. Res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." See W. PROSSER & W.P.
KEETON, supra note 7, § 39 at 242-44. The application of res ipsa is limited in medical
malpractice litigation to cases in which the very nature of the injury is, even to the
layperson, prima facie evidence that the treatment was improperly or negligently performed. Some courts, however, have been willing to enlist the assistance of experts to
determine the applicability of the doctrine. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
52. There is, in theory, a difference between a permissible inference and a rebuttable presumption. Unlike the rebuttable presumption, a permissible inference will not
permit the plaintiff to request a directed verdict if the defendant does not meet his
burden of rebutting the inference of negligence. The only practical difference between
the two is that when the jury finds the probabilities of negligence to be fifty percent, the
party without the burden of proof will prevail. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1100-03 (1956).
53. See Podell, Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 44 INs. COUNS. J. 634, 642-43 (1977).
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the burden of proving that his conduct was not negligent. 54
Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires that the
plaintiff establish that the defendant had exclusive control of
the instrumentality causing the injury, it was of limited value in
the hospital context where treatment is provided by a team of
medical personnel. Until the landmark California decision in
Ybarra v. Spangard,55 courts refused to infer negligence against
multiple defendants unless vicarious or joint liability could be
established. 56
In Ybarra, the court ventured into previously untraveled
territory and permitted a patient who had suffered trauma to his
shoulder while unconscious during an appendectomy to invoke
res ipsa loquitur against all physicians and hospital personnel
who "had any control over his body or the instrumentalities
which might have caused the injuries.

'5 7

According to the inter-

pretation of the doctrine in Ybarra, neither the number of the
defendants, nor their relationship, standing alone, would dictate
the doctrine's applicability. By extending the principles of res
ipsa loquitur to enable a plaintiff to reach an entire medical
team, the court in Ybarra facilitated recovery by shifting the evidentiary burden to all persons possibly at fault.58 Ybarra, however, was based solely upon negligence and did not abrogate
traditional tort principles which require a showing of fault. Res
ipsa loquitur provides only an inference of negligence that is
of each defendant's conclearly rebuttable; the reasonableness
59
issue.
at
remains
thus
duct
More than twenty years later, a New Jersey court stretched
the principles of liability articulated in Ybarra and announced a
theory requiringthat at least one of the multiple defendants be
found negligent. In Anderson v. Somberg,6 0 an injured patient

54. The doctrine presupposes that the defendant has superior knowledge regarding
the source of the injury. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 7, § 39 at 244.

55. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
56. The general rule is that when there are two or more defendants, the plaintiff
cannot prove that it is "more likely than not" that either one was negligent. See W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEEON, supra note 7, § 39 at 250-51. But see Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.

2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
57. 25 Cal. 2d at 494, 154 P.2d at 691. The court held that all defendants were
required to come forth and meet the inference of negligence.
58. Id. at 492-94, 154 P.2d at 691.
59. See Podell, supra note 53, at 642-43.

60. 134 N.J. Super. 1, 338 A.2d 35 (1973), afi'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975), cert.
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sought to recover for injuries resulting when a metal fragment
was severed from a surgical instrument during the course of an
operation and became lodged in the patient's back.6 1 In his complaint, the plaintiff joined four defendants: the physician for
negligent use of the instrument; the hospital for furnishing a defective instrument; the distributor for breach of implied warranty; and the manufacturer for producing a defective instrument. In addition to permitting the suit against multiple
defendants, the court instructed the jury that at least one of the
defendants must be liable.2
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that since there was
no reasonable explanation for the occurrence except for negligence, and "[s]ince all parties had been joined who could reasonably have been connected with that negligence or defect, it was
clear that one of those parties was liable, and at least one could
not succeed in his proofs." 63 Yet, if the uncontradicted testimony of an expert metallurgist is to be believed, the strain on
the instrument that caused the injury was probably cumulative
over the course of several operations. The instrument could have
contained microscopic cracks, unknown to either the surgeon or
the hospital, caused by several instances of twisting or excessive
force during use by other surgeons on the staff. The expert testified that no defect in the instrument was apparent. Arguably,
the hospital had no duty to examine all surgical instruments
under a microscope before each use. Under these facts, it cannot
be said that any party was negligent, and the finding of liability
commanded by the court is probably unjustified. The sole explanation for such a result is that the court was applying strict liability in tort for furnishing surgical instruments. 4 The court in

denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
61. The surgical instrument was a pituitary rongeur, a type of forceps used to remove soft tissue. The surgeon was using the instrument to remove disc material when
the tip or "cup" of the angulated rongeur broke off while it was being manipulated in the
plaintiff's spinal canal. From testimony at the trial, it was never established whether the
break was caused by negligent use of the instrument or by a latent defect. The trial court
also did not determine whether reasonable inspection of the instrument would have revealed a defect. 134 N.J. Super. at 3, 338 A.2d at 36.
62. 134 N.J. Super. at 5, 338 A.2d at 37.

63. 67 N.J. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7.
64. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Mountain pointed out that whether strict liability in tort would be recognized against hospitals, or whether an absolute duty of some
other origin exists which would require the hospital to furnish nondefective instruments,
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Anderson effectively held that under the circumstances the
plaintiff need not meet even a.minimal burden of proving negligence through res ipsa loquitur.
In practice, there may be little difference between assigning
a nearly impossible burden of proof to rebut the inference of
negligence, as in Ybarra, and prefacing the challenge by stating
that, as a matter of law, at least one defendant will be unable to
carry that burden. To the extent that the court in Anderson was
willing to hold the hospital liable for furnishing a dangerous surgical instrument without proof of negligence, it undermined the
fundamental tort principles on which res ipsa loquitur is
founded.6 5 Like Corleto and Gonzales, the Anderson decision
suggests a willingness to impose a more stringent standard of
liability when hospital services are in issue.16
III. STRICT LIABIrITY

FOR HosPITAL PRODUCTS

At the same time that the doctrines of hospital corporate
liability and res ipsa loquitur were being developed along one
line of cases, another line of cases evolved for claims premised
on strict liability in tort or breach of implied warranty against
hospitals for furnishing products in the course of treatment.
Both theories facilitate recovery by removing from the analysis
inquiries into the defendant's conduct and by focusing primarily
on the product that caused the injury. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts holds the "seller" of a "defective
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"

were issues not presented for consideration. Id. at 308 n.3, 338 A.2d at 10 n.3 (Mountain,
J., dissenting).

65. The court in Anderson did not actually label its analysis res ipsa loquitur. Nevertheless, one commentator suggested that "[p]erhaps it would be appropriate to call the
Anderson two-part holding 'New Jersey res ipsa." Recent Developments, 51 WASH. L.
REv. 981, 985 n.14 (citing Adamson, Medical Malpractice:Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
46 MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (1962)).

66. The principle of res ipsa loquitur has commonly been referred to as a rule of
sympathy for the unconscious patient because it puts the burden on the defendants to
give an explanation for the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The traditional justification
for this doctrine is that evidence is usually inaccessible to patients. Critics have argued
that this justification does not acknowledge that the evidentiary difficulties have been
somewhat alleviated by the modern expansion of discovery procedures. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3). Nevertheless, the liberal discovery rules may not benefit an injured plaintiff
who is unable to gather sufficient information to frame his cause of action.
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strictly liable, without fault, for the consumer's injuries.6 The
counterpart to section 402A in the Uniform Commercial Code is
the implied warranty of merchantability."' The Code requires
that a plaintiff injured by a product show that there was a "sale"
of a product "not fit for the ordinary purposes" for which it was
purchased. 9
Although these requirements are minimal, they have proven
to be difficult to apply in the health care context because the
"product" is usually part of treatment and does not resemble
the typical consumer-sales transaction. Moreover, because the
warranty theory is based in contract law, courts have interpreted
"sale" more narrowly in warranty cases than in tort actions
under section 402A. Consequently, most courts that have considered the issue have refused to hold hospitals liable under breach
of warranty for injuries resulting from the use of defective
products."

67. Section 402A of the Restatement provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TonTs § 402A (1965). "Unreasonably dangerous," within the
meaning of § 402A, can also include "failure to warn." A product, although not contaminated or broken or otherwise different from products of its kind, can nevertheless be
defective if it is not accompanied by an adequate warning of its dangers. See Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR'rs § 402A
comment j (1965). See also Dubin v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 7411. App.
3d 932, 393 N.E.2d 588 (1979).
68. U.C.C. § 2-314, 1 U.L.A. 371 (1976).
69. J. WHITE & S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7 (2d ed. 1980). For a
discussion of strict products liability and warranty theory in the hospital context, see
Rubin, Manufacturer and Professional User's Liability for Defective Medical Equipment,

8

AKRON L. REV. 1 (1971).

70. See generally Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967),
aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100,
123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). Cf. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 IMI.
2d 443, 266
N.E.2d 897 (1970)(hospital held liable for providing contaminated blood on the theory
that blood is a product).
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The New York Court of Appeals decision in Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital7' and the New Jersey decision in Magrine
v. Krasnica7 2 illustrate the judicial reluctance to impose liability
upon hospitals for breach of warranty. In Perlmutter,the plaintiff was injured by a transfusion of contaminated blood, 3 while
in Magrine the product was a defective dental needle.7 4 The
courts in both cases adopted what has been coined the "essence
of the transaction" test. 5 Under this test, if the performance of
a service forms the essence of the transaction, there can be no
breach of implied warranty even if a product was the source of
the injury. In contrast, the "essence" of a sale transaction between a retailer and consumer is the sale itself.7 6 Because the
courts in Perlmutter and Magrine found that the hospital and
the dentist, respectively, were engaged primarily in providing
services, they declined to impose liability.
In contrast to the narrow interpretation of "sale" in breach
of warranty cases, courts have interpreted "sale" broadly in tort
71. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
72. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), af'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
73. 308 N.Y. at 103, 123 N.E.2d at 796.
74. 94 N.J. Super. at 230, 227 A.2d at 540. The plaintiff in Magrine sued only the
dentist, who could not determine the manufacturer of the needle.
75. See generally Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAMi L. REV. 447 (1971); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLUm. L. REv. 653 (1957).
76. This test is not unique to the health care context. In Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc.,
54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), the court, while reaffirming the Magrine decision, held
that a beauty parlor, in applying a lotion to the plaintiff's hair, had transacted both a
sale and a service. Thus, the court in Gimbel did not distinguish Magrine from the case
in which the product was sold separately for the plaintiff to apply herself.
When the sales/service distinction has been applied to hospitals, the plaintiff has
attempted to characterize the defendant-hospital as a supplier of the "goods" in question. In Silverhart v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971), a
surgical needle broke and lodged in the patient's lower pelvic region during a hysterectomy. The plaintiff urged that the hospital, as a "supplier" of a defective product, should
be held strictly liable. The court in Silverhart observed that other cases had decided
that the warranty provisions were applicable to retafIors, bailors, and lessors. Nevertheless, the court distinguished these cases, holding that the hospital did not play the same
integral role in the production and marketing of the product. The court determined that
when the hospital obtained the instrument, it was merely a piece of equipment and the
hospital was merely a "user." Thus, the essence of the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant was the delivery of professional services, not the distribution of a
product. The court concluded that the policy considerations justifying strict products
liability for the marketing of defective products did not extend to the professional relationship between physicians and patients where the elements of a sale were not present.
20 Cal. App. 3d at 1028, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 191.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

36
South
Carolina
Law Review,
36, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.[Vol.
4
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
actions under section 402A. 77 Notwithstanding the more flexible
interpretation, however, it remains difficult to determine
whether there has been a "sale" in strict liability actions.78 Nevertheless, patients injured by health care providers have
achieved better success using a strict liability theory than using
the principles of breach of warranty.
The Supreme Court of Illinois was the first to permit a patient to recover under strict products liability for injuries caused
by a defective medical product. In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital," the court rejected the defendant hospital's ar-

gument that furnishing blood for transfusions did not constitute
the sale of a product.8 0 Because the provision of blood was ancillary to medical services, the court determined that the sale was
separable from the service and therefore was subject to the provisions of section 402A.8 1 Consequently, the hospital was held
strictly liable because contaminated blood is unreasonably
dangerous.8 2

77. Cunningham v. MacNeil Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970),
held that the transfusion of blood was a "sale" of a product under § 402A. Cunningham
relied primarily on the statement in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f
(1965) that, "It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such products."
78. Cf. Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968). The Barbee court held
that the improper fitting and prescription of contact lenses was not a sale of an unreasonably dangerous product under § 402A.
79. 47 11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
80. In rejecting the sales/service distinction, the court remarked: "It seems to us a
distortion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service,
and then employ this transformed material in erecting the framework of a major policy
decision." Id. at 450, 266 N.E.2d at 901 (quoting Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.,
185 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
81. 47 Ill. 2d at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 900-01. The court relied upon public policy considerations in proclaiming that the institution that has undertaken the duty to provide
and distributethe defective product for human consumption should bear the legal consequences of the entire transaction. Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
82. The evolution of the "bad blood" cases is a very interesting part of products
liability law. These cases often are concerned with undiscoverable or unavoidable dangers. In Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974), aff'd, 66 N.J.
448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975), the plaintiffs decedent became ill and died from hepatitis after
receiving a blood transfusion at the defendant hospital. The blood used for transfusion
came from both the hospital and the nonprofit county blood bank. In considering the
liability of the hospital, the court stated that the relationship between the hospital and
blood bank in no way resembled a commercial enterprise, and thus the policies of strict
liability did not apply. 127 N.J. Super. at 336, 317 A.2d at 395. The court further stated
that at the time of the transfusion there were no known tests for determining whether
blood contained a hepatitis virus. The presence of the virus was unavoidable, the product
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Once a court makes -th-e-threshold determination that a defendant has engaged in the sale of a product, the plaintiff still
must prove that the product was defective and that an injury
resulted from its use. With respect to surgical instruments or
impure drugs, the defect typically relates to a condition inherent
in the product itself. A defect may also arise, however, out of a
failure to warn of unavoidable dangers in the product. It is the
failure to warn, not the danger itself, that makes the product
unreasonably dangerous. 3 Generally, the warning should be part
of the packaged product. However, in the case of most hospital
products, such as contaminated blood or x-radiation, the patient
never sees the "package," so the warning is effectively a service
which, if provided at all, must come as an administrative function of the hospital.
84
In Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center,
the Illinois Court of Appeals expanded the Cunningham decision and held that the hospital's failure to warn the plaintiff of
the carcinogenic properties of x-radiation prior to giving treatment rendered the "product" defective and unreasonably dangerous.85 Although ultimately reversed by the Illinois Supreme

was highly useful and desirable, and the risk was known but reasonable. Thus, the product was not unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 338, 340, 317 A.2d at 396, 397.
While Brody concerned a charitable blood bank, statistics reveal that blood from
paid donors in large cities is ten times more likely to carry a hepatitis virus than blood
from volunteers. See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal,
24 STAN. L. REv. 439 (1972). Because of this increased risk, the FDA now requires that
blood from paid donors must be labeled as such. 21 C.F.R. § 606.120(b)(2)(1978). This
opens the way for liability when the hospital uses blood purchased from a commercial
blood bank. To reduce the liability exposure of blood providers and hospitals, many
states have enacted statutes which provide that implied warranties and/or strict liability
in tort shall not apply to blood transactions. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (1976)
(literally applies only to implied warranties) with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606

(West 1979) (eliminates both implied warranty and strict liability for these transactions).
See generally W. KEETON, D. OWN & J. MONTGOMERY, CASES AND MATERALS ON PRODucTs LABiLrrY AND SAFETY 458-60 (1980).
The Illinois legislature eviscerated much of the Cunningham decision, although the

restrictive statute specifically eliminated only "blood, blood products and other human
tissues." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 181-84 (1977).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments j, k (1965).
84. 74 Ill. App. 3d 932, 393 N.E.2d 588 (1979), rev'd, 83 IlM.2d 277, 415 N.E.2d 350
(1980).
85. The defendant hospital treated the plaintiff's tonsillitis with x-radiation. Many
years later, the plaintiff developed cancer. He alleged that the hospital had been negligent in administering treatment and that it should be strictly liable in tort for supplying
a defective product. 74 IMI.
App. 3d at 933, 393 N.E.2d at 590.
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Court, the appellate court, in permitting an action in strict products liability, concluded that "the supply of x-radiation. . . for
treatment purposes by a hospital, for which a charge is made,
places such hospital in the business of introducing such x-radiation in the stream of commerce." ' Satisfied that the sale element was present, the court determined that x-radiation could
be considered a product that was unreasonably dangerous if no
warning was provided.8 7 Although the failure to warn under
some circumstances might be considered a product defect, providing an explanation or warning of dangerous side effects to
treatment is, in the hospital context, an administrative service.
In most "failure to warn" cases, courts will hold the defendant liable only if he knew or should have known of his product's dangers.8 8 In essence, the standard for warning defects is
one of negligence and therefore could fall within the ambit of
Darling." In Dubin, however, the hospital claimed that the state
of the art was such that it could not have known of the dangers
associated with x-radiation. This standard arose from the decision in Woodhill v. Parke, Davis & Co.,90 which held that it was
necessary for a plaintiff in a products liability action to allege
that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the prod-

86. Id. at 945, 393 N.E.2d at 597.
87. Id. at 943, 393 N.E.2d at 595. Dubin remains important also for its definition of
"product":
[W]e find that a "product" with an unreasonably dangerous condition may
subject those responsible for placing it in the stream of commerce to strict
liability in tort... ; may be unchanged from its natural state, viable, and not
the result of a manufacturing process; must be of a fixed nature; and must be
capable of being placed in the stream of commerce. Moreover, to satisfy the
public policy reasons underlying the concept of strict liability in tort, we must
also find that the "product" is something that may endanger human life and
health; something whose intended use has been solicited and thought to be safe
and suitable; and something that has reaped a profit for those placing it in the
stream of commerce.
Id. at 939, 393 N.E.2d at 593.
88. E.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See generally Shandell, Failure to Warn-A Drug
Manufacturer'sLiability, 14 TRA LAW Q. 5 (1982).
89. One commentator has noted that "Ithe requirement that the defendant have
had knowledge of the defect is a puzzling intrusion of negligence theory into the area of
strict liability. Only a negligent failure to warn is regarded as a defect." Weyna, supra
note 50, at 408 (emphasis in original).
90. 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978).
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uct's dangers.9 1 The appellate court in Dubin held that since
subsequent research ultimately revealed the hazards, the hospital could be held strictly liable.92 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no allegation that the x-radiation
itself was unreasonably dangerous. Rather, the plaintiff's case
rested on the inappropriateness of the applicationof x-radiation
in treating the plaintiff's condition. Therefore, the thrust of the
plaintiff's argument was that the "danger"' resulted not from a
product, but from the medical decision to administer x-radiation. Such errors of professional judgment were held to be governed by a negligence standard, not one of strict liability.9
The Illinois courts in Dubin and Cunningham overcame the
obstacle of the sales/service distinction, which was premised on
the existence of an identifiable product. "Product" was broadly
defined in these decisions, but the cases ostensibly did not extend strict liability to reach hospital administrative services.
One of the most recent decisions extending the principles of
strict products liability to reach the hospital itself was that of
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Providence Hospital v.
Truly.9 4 During the course of an eye operation, the physician injected into the plaintiff's eye a contaminated ocular fluid which
resulted in severe eye damage. 5 The fluid had been supplied by
the hospital pharmacy, where it had been sterilized and stored
in a vial containing a solution of formaldehyde.9 6 Although the
allegedly contaminated vial was never recovered, the trial court
found that improper handling of the vial during the sterilization
97
process caused the contamination.
The plaintiff alleged negligence, implied warranty and strict
liability against both the hospital and Cooper Laboratories, the
manufacturer of the drug. The jury absolved the hospital of negligence, but found for the plaintiff against the hospital on the
warranty count. The court of civil appeals affirmed, rejecting the

91. Id. at 351, 374 N.E.2d at 686. Because the defendant in Dubin did not assert
this as a ground for dismissal, he was foreclosed from arguing the issue. 74 11. App. 3d at
945-46, 393 N.E.2d at 598.
92. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 934, 393 N.E.2d at 596.
93. 83 IIl. 2d 277, 280-81, 415 N.E.2d 350, 352 (1980).
94. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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hospital's contention that implied warranty and strict liability
actions could not be maintained against hospitals and other
health-care providers.9 8
The court noted that the Texas Business and Commerce
Code specifically excluded only "blood, blood plasma or other
human tissue or organs" 9' from the coverage of implied warranty, and determined that all others were to be included. 100 In
making the sales/service distinction in the warranty context, the
court in Truly implied that, regardless of the existence of a
"sale" of a defective product, the hospital's administrative services in selecting and preparing the product for use would subject it to strict liability if carried out improperly. 10 '
The following year, the same court in Thomas v. St. Joseph
Hospital0 2 held a hospital strictly liable for fatal burns to a patient whom it had provided with an inflammable hospital
gown. 10 3 The appellate court characterized the hospital's furnishing of the gown as a hybrid sales/service transaction, holding
that the supply of the product was an integral part of providing
its service. 0 4 Moving away from the "essence of the transaction"
analysis, the court in Thomas examined the intrinsic nature of

98. Id. at 131.
99. The statute upon which the plaintiff's implied warranty claim was based recognized only the following exclusion:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable
to the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or organs from a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissue or organs. Such blood,
blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for the purpose of this Title [Title 1
of the Uniform Commercial Code] be considered commodities subject to sale or
barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
TEx.Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(e)(Vernon 1968), cited in Truly, 611 S.W.2d at 133
(emphasis supplied by the court in Truly).
100. 611 S.W.2d at 133.
101. Id. at 132.
102. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
103. The action was brought by the survivor of a patient who died from severe
burns after he dropped a lighted match on his hospital gown. The alleged manufacturer
of the gown was granted a directed verdict on the basis that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that it was indeed the manufacturer. The jury found that the hospital was
not negligent but returned a verdict in the amount of $46,500 for the plaintiff on the
joint allegation of breach of warranty and strict liability. Id. at 793-94.
104. The court noted that the gown had been billed to the patient as part of the
hospital's overhead. In distinguishing prior cases that had found strict liability inapplicable to health care providers, the court held that the medical services were dependent
upon the supply of the product. Id. at 796-97.
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the service to determine whether strict liability should apply.
IV.

05

STRICT LIABILITY FOR HOSPITAL SERVICES

The policy considerations that led to the adoption of strict
liability for defective products may also apply to support its extension to services transactions. In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,- 0 6 a federal district court in Wisconsin bridged the conceptual difference between "services" and "products" and held that
a hospital could be strictly liable for defective services under
limited circumstances. The court in Johnson rejected the sales/
service distinction and determined that the relevant inquiry was
"whether it [was] in the public interest for the consumer/patient
or the supplier/hospital to bear the loss incurred by defective,
though non-negligent, services. 10 7 As policies weighing in favor
of strict liability on the facts of that case, the court considered
that serious consequences can result when a patient receives defective hospital services, that laymen are unable to recognize or
control defective services, and that doctors rely on the hospital
for information about their patients' conditions.10° The court
stated:
It is argued, since strict tort liability should not apply to
professional medical services by doctors (if that is true, and i
believe it is without deciding so at this time), that it follows
that strict liability should not apply to mechanical and administrative services by hospitals. I do not think this follows. Medical sciences are not exact. A patient cannot consider a doctor's
treatment to be defective simply because it does not cure his
ailment. All that a doctor can be expected to provide is adequate treatment commensurate with the state of medical science. In other words, doctors do not contract with patients to
provide cures but rather to provide treatment in a non-negli-

105. Id.
106. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
107. Id. at 1066. Johnson may be read as standing for the principle that one of the
"mechanical" services that a hospital provides is the training of physicians and personnel
to use its equipment. Thus, under Johnson the hospital can be held strictly liable for its
failure to properly discharge that responsibility. See also Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 IlM. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439
Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970); Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa. Super.
381, 387 A.2d 480 (1978).
108. 355 F. Supp. at 1067.
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gent manner. To hold medical professionals strictly liable
under these circumstances would not promote any social benefit. In fact, if that standard were applied to doctors, it might
make them reluctant to assume responsibility for the treatment of patients, particularly when such treatment involves a
developing area of medicine, which would work a serious social
disservice. 10 9

The court in Johnson concluded that in view of the vague distinction between professional and nonprofessional (administra-

tive) services within the hospital, the applicability of strict liability to hospitals should be determined on an ad hoc basis 110
depending upon whether, under the circumstances, the public
interest would be served."'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed the Johnson decision in Hoven v. Kelble,1 1 2 a malpractice action in which the

plaintiff attempted to use Johnson to maintain a strict liability
claim against his physician and the hospital. The court distinguished Johnson by noting that the plaintiff in Hoven alleged
defective professional services. The court emphasized that Johnson would permit strict liability only for mechanical or adminis-

trative hospital functions and would not extend it to professional medical services.113 The court noted that Johnson has
been criticized for distinguishing between professional and administrative or mechanical services, a distinction which is at
least as vague and confusing as the sales/service test abandoned

in Johnson.1 4 Furthermore, the Wisconsin court attacked the
plaintiff's contention that other cases have upheld strict liability

in tort or implied warranty actions where "defective services"

109. Id. at 1066-67.
110. The court acknowledged that most jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, distinguished between sales and services and applied strict products liability only to sales
transactions. The court in Johnson stated that liability should not be based upon a
mechanical application of the sales/service distinction, but should be based upon the
policy interests which impose liability. Id. at 1066.
111. Id. at 1067. The court in Johnson noted that the sales/service characterization
had been abrogated in several contemporary cases. Id. at 1066. See Buckeye Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972); Newark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa.
501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
112. 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
113. Id. at 466, 256 N.W.2d at 390.
114. Id. at 466 n.13, 256 N.W.2d at 390 n.13.
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caused injury. Cases cited in support of that proposition concerned services of a routine or simple nature; 115 the decisions are
unanimous in requiring that negligence be shown in order16 to recover when professional services are allegedly defective.'
A Pennsylvania superior court in Grubb v. Albert Einstein
Medical Center1 also cited Johnson in holding that while the
professional services of physicians would continue to be governed by a negligence standard, a hospital may be strictly liable
for its administrative services. The issue before the court in
Grubb was whether the hospital should be subject to strict liability for supplying an allegedly defective surgical tool. 18 The
court in Grubb cited with approval the court's reliance in Johnson upon public policy concerns as a means of establishing the
proper standard of liability.'1 9 The opinion stated:

115. Id. at 463, 256 N.W.2d at 388 (citing Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35,
151 So. 2d 767 (1963); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App.
325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972); Hill v. Polar Pantries, Inc., 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885
(1951)).
116. 79 Wis. 2d at 462-63, 256 N.W.2d at 388-89 (citing La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25
Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972); Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super.
529, 295 A.2d 363 (1972); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76
(1974); Barbee v. Rogers & Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968)).
The court in Hoven concluded:
There have been many studies of the delivery of health care in this country and of the problems of the malpractice concept of tort liability. Although
there may be general dissatisfaction with our present tort medical injury compensation system, moving from the malpractice concept-even with its many
problems-to a strict liability system at the present time appears to be a dubious move. Strict liability has been far from a panacea in products cases, and
there has been reluctance to advocate the extension of the principle to medical
services. Several commentators have proposed "no-fault liability" in lieu of
negligence or strict-liability concepts. The ability of the judicial system to create a scheme of strict liability or no-fault liability rules for medical accidents
has been questioned. Because of the unknown costs and the inability to assess
the results, commentators have shied away from advocating the adoption of
full programs of strict liability or no-fault liability in the medical service area
and have suggested that the legislature and private groups establish experimental and elective techniques to deal with injuries occurring from medical
services. The Report of the Secretary's [Dep't. of Health, Education & Welfare] Commission on Medical Malpractice, p. 100 (1973), concluded that it
could not recommend adoption of an untested system which may cause even
more severe problems than exist under medical malpractice.
79 Wis. 2d at 471-72, 256 N.W.2d at 392-93.
117. 255 Pa. Super. 381, 387 A.2d 480 (1978).
118. This issue was left open in Anderson v. Somberg. See supra note 64.
119. 255 Pa. Super. at 401, 387 A.2d at 490.
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In adopting the strict liability as set forth we are making a
reasonable extrapolation from the already expanding interpretation of 402A, and clear policy considerations. The surgical
patient is without control over the procedures and instruments
used upon him. His health and future safety are at the mercy
and skill of the treating physicians and the instruments he
120
employs.
V. ANALYSIS
The law of hospital malpractice has changed dramatically
since the concepts of charitable immunity and respondeat superior developed, and it is now expanding in a way that even the

court in Darling probably would not have foreseen. Since Darling was decided, the decisions suggest a trend toward a stricter
standard of fault for hospital administrative services as well as
for products supplied in the course of hospital treatment.
Clearly, however, most of the commentary considering the issue

of hospital corporate liability concludes that public policy militates against its use for purely professional services. Corporate

liability has been asserted as a highly effective means of regulating the quality of medical practice and controlling professional
incompetence. The threat of direct hospital liability for the malpractice of its physicians is said to be a stronger deterrent than
are state licensing, voluntary self-regulation, or malpractice actions against the physician. 21 Furthermore, in many cases, the
doctrine of respondeat superior has proven inadequate to deter
incompetence since there often is no employment or agency relationship to which traditional tort principles may be extended.122
Conversely, other commentators argue that existing tort principles are broad enough to adequately protect and compensate injured hospital patients. To hold hospitals liable outside the
bounds of existing respondeat superior principles would need-

120. Id.

121. Note, Hospital CorporateLiability: An Effective Solution to ControllingPrivate Physician Incompetence, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 342, 345 (1979).

122. Id. at 357. Another rationale that has been offered for corporate liability is that
the hospital's grant of staff membership is a selective process which represents to the
public that only competent physicians are chosen. Id. at 367. This reasoning is faulty as
an argument for corporate liability since it is no more than an ostensible agency concept
for which liability already exists under traditional tort principles.
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lessly expose hospitals to liability and might encourage spurious
litigation. 123 A large percentage of patients admitted into hospitals are admitted by physicians whom the patients have chosen
to treat them. The patient places his trust in his own doctor and
relies on him for treatment, so it cannot be said in such cases
that the patient expects to be cured by hospital services rather
than by his own doctor's professional judgment. 124 Consequently, existing negligence law holds the hospital liable under
respondeat superior only when a sufficiently close relationship
125
exists between the physician and the hospital.
The patient's physician owes a duty of care which clearly
cannot be delegated to others. Yet, this fact was effectively ignored by the New Jersey court in Corleto. The medical staff as a
whole has no duty running directly to patients and should not
be held liable for mistakes of professional judgment by individual doctors. 126 To hold the medical staff liable would deter participation in peer review committees which were organized to allow professionals to police themselves and to enhance the
27
quality of health care.1
The purpose of imposing direct liability upon hospitals is to
encourage the hospital to become more active in the care of patients. The converse of this argument may be that hospitals are
encouraged to disrupt the doctor-patient relationship and to interfere in the professional medical judgment of staff physicians. 12 Corporate liability outside of traditional respondeat superior principles would also tend to discourage the granting of
visiting physician privileges to nonstaff doctors, depriving the
29
patient of quality health care primarily out of fear of liability.

123. Comment, Extending Strict Liability to Health Care Providers: Can Consumers Afford the Protection?,13 TEX TECH L. REV. 1435, 1460-61 (1982).
124. Note, Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital Corporate Liability of
Hospitals Arrives in Wisconsin, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 453, 480.
125. See Brown v. La Soci~t6 Frangaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 138 Cal. 475, 71
P. 516 (1903). See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126. Loveridge, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California, 14 PAC. L. J.
803, 812 (1983).
127. Id.

128. See Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to Controlling
Private Physician Incompetence, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 342, 363 (1979); Note, Corporate
Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Monitor and Oversee Medical Treatment-Bost v. Riley, 17 WAXE FOREST L. REV. 309, 319 (1981).
129. Note, supra note 124, at 475.
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Broader public policy concerns should not be ignored out of
sympathy for a plaintiff who for some reason is forced to look
solely to the hospital for redress for his physician's malpractice.
Hospitals are providers of essential services and play a vital role
in society. Even when insured, the hospital and ultimately the
patient pay the price for corporate liability through increased
premiums and hospital rates. Yet, there is another price exacted
by hospital liability: the increased cost of health care brought
about by the defensive practice of medicine results in unnecessary testing procedures and extended hospital stays. 130 Finally,
these new theories for liability may result in the demise of the
smaller hospital which lacks the funds to increase both its insurance coverage and the quality of its staff. These smaller hospitals may also lack the money and personnel to thoroughly monitor treatment by staff physicians.' 3 ' Thus, in the long run,
corporate liability beyond existing respondeat superior principles may actually diminish the quality of health care.
In the area of medical products liability, courts often strain
to characterize events to impose strict liability, although existing
principles of law already provide remedies for injuries caused by
defective medical products. In contrast, courts must substantially deviate from the traditional concept of strict liability to
reach services. This distinction between hospital products and
services is often difficult to discern and does little to serve the
needs of the injured patient. Nor does it appear to promote any
other social policy that would justify its use. Nevertheless,
courts have preferred to mold their decisions into existing forms
of "product" or "service" transactions rather than to dispense
with that illusory distinction in favor of an ad hoc policy determination of whether liability should be imposed.
Much of the difficulty in deciding whether to apply stricter
standards of liability stems from the absence of an identifiable
sale of a product by the hospital. Decisions such as Cunningham, Truly, and Thomas broadened the concept of a "sale"
transaction in situations in which products were supplied to patients in the course of medical treatment. It is questionable,
however, whether the existence of a sale is an adequate basis for
resolving the ultimate issue of liability. To the extent that a

130. Note, supra note 121, at 367; Comment, supra note 123, at 1460-61.

131. See Note, supra note 124, at 475.
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"sale" transaction identifies a party who is able to minimize injury and spread the costs, the distinction might serve a legitimate purpose. Nevertheless, the vague distinction between sales
and services is not an appropriate basis for establishing liability. 3 2 Only a small minority of courts have extended strict liability to hospitals for defective products used in the course of medical treatment, even though a legal framework for doing so
exists. This suggests that the courts will not easily expand the
doctrine to include hospital administrative services. 133
The district court in Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.134 is
alone in extending strict liability to reach purely service transactions. Unfortunately, the broad ad hoc policy considerations outlined by the court in Johnson do not establish predictable
guidelines for determining when hospitals should be held strictly
liable. This lack of guidance leads to uncertainty in the health
care industry concerning the types of injuries occurring within
hospitals that will expose them to liability. The court did suc-

132. The liability for failure to warn that the appellate court in Dubin attempted to
impose illustrates that the distinction between products and services is dubious. Failure
to warn is generally considered to be based on negligence concepts, using a "reasonable
manufacturer" standard. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Prescription drugs, posing a threat of dangerous side effects to a sensitive consumer, are the most obvious example. While liability
will be discharged through a proper warning, failure to give adequate warning or instruction constitutes a "product defect." Thus again, the judicial merging of negligence and
strict products liability to reach the delivery of medical services is illustrated.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) specifically contemplates the application of strict liability to "unavoidably unsafe" prescription drugs. It
provides that "such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective.... ." This provision has been interpreted to mean that
strict liability may be imposed if the duty to warn is not fulfilled or if the warning given
is inadequate. See generally Shandell, supra note 88.
133. Hospital advocates advance another policy argument: health care institutions
are consumers of products, not distributors. Hospitals rely on the manufacturer to prevent defects as much as does the individual consumer. They do not promote the sale of
products or make individual contracts to sell them. The hospital's liability for negligent
selection of products should be adequate from a policy standpoint to compensate injured
patients. See Crump, Should Health Care ProvidersBe Strictly Liable for Product Related Injuries?, 36 Sw. L.J. 831, 841 (1982). A further contention is that if no fault principles apply to products furnished in the course of hospital treatment, a doctor who surgically implants a product which is initially free of defects when placed in the patient may
subject himself and the hospital to liability if the product fails at a later time. Following
the typical strict liability pattern, the doctor would be considered a "seller" of a product
and would be exposed to liability as any retailer. Thus, the medical profession would
become virtually an insurer of results. Id.
134. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Wis. 1973).
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ceed, however, in demonstrating that the policies supporting
strict products liability in general may apply with equal force in
the hospital context.
The principles of strict liability in tort evolved out of judicial dissatisfaction with the limitations inherent in traditional
negligence and warranty theories. The public policy considerations which influenced the courts in pioneering strict liability
appear to be equally compelling in a hospital setting. The most
persuasive argument for extending strict liability to hospitals is
that it provides an incentive for hospitals to identify and alleviate unnecessary risks. Just as manufacturers are in a better position than are consumers to discover and prevent product defects, hospitals are better able to institute safeguards to
minimize injuries caused by improper administration of services.
For example, the Anderson decision illustrates that only the
hospital staff generally has the ability to police itself.'3 5 Patients
play no role in the selection of the hospital's staff and must rely
on the hospital to maintain the quality of services and medical
136
products supplied to them.
A hospital is also in a better position than are patients to
absorb and allocate the costs of injuries. Although the loss might
be ruinous for the individual patient, most large hospitals can
absorb such costs and redistribute them among all consumers
with relatively minimal burden. This is analogous to requiring
that each patient purchase, for a nominal fee (the patient's share
of the marginal increase in the cost of services), an "insurance"
premium which would cover medical injuries regardless of fault
or origin. The hospitals would administer this fictitious policy
and might minimize its own exposure to liability by impleading
or seeking indemnity from the distributor or manufacturer if a
product were involved. The hospital would further protect itself
by purchasing liability insurance, now a common practice. Furthermore, the difficulty that plaintiffs normally encounter in
137
proving negligence may be alleviated.

135. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

136. Frequently, it is the hospital institution itself that attracts the consumer because of its reputation for quality in its professional services and facilities. It should be

emphasized that it is not the failure of treatment to which strict liability would attach
but rather only the presence of some defect in the delivery of such services.
137. Injured patients often encounter difficulty in establishing the source of their
injury and in obtaining sufficient proof of negligence. The burden may be compounded
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It is not surprising that the extension of strict liability to
include hospital administrative services has met with considerable resistance.1 38 Hospitals claim that strict liability is functionally equivalent to requiring them to be insurers of medical services. Specific results cannot be guaranteed and it is often
argued that the threat of liability forces hospitals to practice
"defensive medicine."""9 Yet, no court has ever suggested that
strict liability should be imposed merely because medical treatment fails. 140 Moreover, it is universally held that medical services provided by physicians continue to fall under traditional
tort principles of malpractice, and a specific finding of negligence is required in order for a plaintiff to prevail. In assessing
liability, the courts must be aware that a fine line exists between
the practice of medicine and administration of hospital care.
Cases such as Darling obscure this line, but the court in Johnson, explicitly noting this problem, held that the determination
of liability should be made on a case-by-case basis. 4

when the harm involves a product whose manufacturer cannot be identified or is beyond
the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the reluctance of physicians to testify against one
another in malpractice litigation hampers a plaintiff in carrying his burden of proof. See
Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv.
250 (1956). A number of courts have recognized that medical experts are usually unwilling to testify against a colleague. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234
P.2d 34, 36 (1951)(Carter, J., dissenting); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr., Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 569, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957).
138. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
139. For example, it is contended that hospitals would be forced to limit their services to performing only "safe" procedures, and to order unnecessary tests without regard to cost-efficiency.
140. It can be argued that in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974),
the court came dangerously close to holding the physician strictly liable for his professional services. The court nevertheless articulated negligence principles for failing to perform the glaucoma test. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. In Carmichael v.
Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), the court held that strict liability
was inapplicable to a physician. The court stated that because the physician's treatment
involves a balancing of risks to the patient, liability should only be imposed upon a finding of negligence. See also Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d
363 (1977); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977). The Magner and
Hoven courts held that although strict liability may be appropriate for defective products, it was inapplicable to physicians' services. But see Mallor, Liability Without Fault
for Professional Services: Toward A New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9
SEroN HALL L. REV.474 (1978).
141. 355 F. Supp. at 1067.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

33

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.[Vol.
4
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VI.

36

CONCLUSION

The Darling decision was significant in casting aside the
distinction between administrative and medical hospital functions in favor of a standard which requires health care providers
to use due care in granting staff privileges to physicians as well
as in supervising hospital treatment. Since that time, the decisions have shifted away from these simple negligence principles
and have imposed on the hospital a higher standard of care
while simultaneously lowering the burden of proof required by
the plaintiff, as, for example, through the use of res ipsa
loquitur.
As courts attempt to invoke doctrines of strict liability, either in tort or warranty, they encounter serious analytical
problems. While decisions such as Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. have rejected the distinction between sales and services as a
basis for deciding whether to impose strict liability, they cannot
shed the artificial distinction between administrative and medical functions which was rejected in Bing v. Turnig and in Darling. Medical services are based on an imperfect science, and results cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, treatment by physicians
must continue to be governed by a negligence standard.
When, however, the hospital provides defective administrative services or furnishes a defective product in the course of
treatment, no exercise of professional judgment is required.
While there are strong policy arguments to the contrary, the
hospital as a provider of products occupies no better position
than any other link in a chain of distribution, and today courts
do not hesitate to hold them liable.
Because of the wide spectrum of hospital services and products, a case-by-case approach is necessary and it may not be
practicable in any one case to offer guidelines which could apply
under a different set of facts. Even with its disadvantages in a
hospital setting, strict liability analysis allows courts to deal
openly and candidly with the issues of liability without being
forced to bend traditional tort principles to accommodate injured plaintiffs whose cases do not fall within existing negligence
doctrine.
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